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8.1  Introduction 
In the past two decades, we have experienced in the foreign exchange mar- 
kets significant temporary fluctuations in the exchange rates of major currenc- 
ies. For example, by plotting the movements of  the yeddollar exchange rate 
after 1973, we can see a clear downward trend in this exchange rate in the long 
run. However, we can also see that the trend was not monotonic in the short 
run and that there were significant temporary fluctuations around the trend (see 
fig. 8.1). The purpose of  this paper is to investigate why  the exchange rate 
shows such significant temporary fluctuations. The model of the following 
analysis is based on a model of money in the utility function with liquidity-in- 
advance. Following Fukuda (1  990), we investigate the dynamic properties of 
a small open economy version of this monetary model. 
The methodology used in the following analysis is an application of  the 
theory of “chaos.” In the previous literature, Benhabib and Day  (1982), Day 
(1982, 1983), and Stutzer (1980) are the first attempts to study chaotic phe- 
nomena in economic models. Authors such as Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) 
derive the competitive equilibrium cycles in a two-sector growth model, while 
authors such as Grandmont (1  985) characterize the chaotic phenomena in over- 
lapping generations models. In addition, Matsuyama (1990, 1991) and Fukuda 
(1990) find that the model of money in the utility function can produce chaotic 
dynamic paths.’ However, throughout these studies there exist few attempts to 
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Fig. 8.1  Yen / dollar exchange rate between 1973 and 1991 
analyze endogenous periodic dynamic paths in open economy models. Excep- 
tional studies are Nishimura and Yano (1990), Woodford (1990a), King, Wal- 
lace, and Weber (1992), and Nishimura and Ohyama (1992). Nishimura and 
Yano (1990) and Nishimura and Ohyama (1992) have analyzed endogenous 
periodic dynamic paths in an open economy version of  a two-sector growth 
model. However, since their analysis is based on the model without money, no 
attention has been paid to the endogenous  cycles of exchange rates. The studies 
of Woodford (1990a) and King et al. (1992) are more related to our analysis 
because they deal with sunspot equilibria of nominal exchange rates. However, 
both models are based on cash-in-advance models and a different type of atten- 
tion has been paid to the dynamic properties of  endogenous exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
In the following analysis, we show that a model of money in the utility func- 
tion can produce periodic and chaotic dynamic paths under the flexible ex- 
change rate regime. In the analysis, the conflict between income and substitu- 
tion effects plays an important role in producing endogenous business cycles 
under the flexible exchange rate regime. That is, an expected depreciation of 
the future exchange rate always has a negative substitution effect on current 
money demand for the domestic currency. However, since the depreciation re- 
quires more money holdings for the future transaction, it always has a positive 
income effect on current money demand. Hence, the total effect of the change 
in the future exchange rate on current money demand is always ambiguous, 
causing the endogenous exchange rate cycles in our model. 
Needless to say, our approach is not the only explanation for the temporary 
fluctuations of  the exchange rate. For example, Ito (1987) and Ito and Roley 
(1987) present evidence that (unanticipated)  news may explain most temporary 
fluctuations of the yeddollar exchange rate in the 1980s. In addition, Frankel 
and Froot (1990) and Wei (1991) show that the presence of fundamental trad- 
ers and chartists can explain the large dollar cycle and chaotic exchange rate 205  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
movement in the  1980s. This paper does not deny the significance of  these 
earlier studies. Instead, we try to present a supplementary explanation of some 
temporary fluctuations of exchange rates which these studies do not necessar- 
ily explain. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a basic small 
open economy model  of  money in  the utility  function. Following Fukuda 
(1992), the dynamic properties of the model are analyzed under the flexible 
exchange rate regime in sections 8.3 and 8.4. Section 8.5 extends the model 
by introducing the endogenous labor supply. Section 8.6 shows that the fixed 
exchange rate regime may rule out the possibility of endogenous cycles in the 
economy. Section 8.7 interprets our results by using a phase diagram, and sec- 
tion 8.8 considers a welfare implication of our analysis. Section 8.9 summa- 
rizes our main results. 
8.2  The Basic Model 
The basic model of the following analysis is based on Fukuda (1992). We 
consider a small open economy inhabited by  identical agents. Until section 
8.5, we assume that there is a single, perishable, tradable consumption good in 
the  economy.  Each  representative  agent  maximizes  the  following  utility 
function: 
where c, is consumption at period t, pr is the domestic price level at period t, 
M,  is the amount of domestic currency at the beginning of period t, and p is a 
discount rate satisfying 0 < p < 1. For all c, > 0 and M/p,  > 0, we assume 
that u and v are weakly concave and twice-continuously differentiable (i.e., 
u"  5  and v"  5  0) and are weakly increasing (i.e., u' 2  and v'  2  0). 
The budget constraint of the representative agent is 
where yr is exogenous income, T, is the lump-sum tax (or transfer if negative), 
r is the world real interest rate, and b, is the real amount of foreign bonds at 
period t. 
In our representative agent model, the change in the real amount of foreign 
bonds is equal to the real amount of  current account surplus. Furthermore, 
because of  the law of  one price, it holds that p, = ep* (i.e., the purchasing 
power parity condition) where p* is foreign price level and e, is the nominal 
exchange rate in terms of domestic currency. Since the model is a small open 
economy, world real interest rate,  r;  and foreign price, p*, are exogenously 
given in our model. In order to rule out extreme consumption behavior in the 
limit, we assume that world real interest rate, I; is constant and equal to the 206  Shin-ichi Fukuda 
rate of time preference of the representative agent, that is, P( 1 + r) = 1, in the 
following analysis.*  We also normarize foreign price p* to be one. 
Until section 8.5, we assume that exogenous income y, is constant over time 
(i.e., yr = y)  and is not  storable. We  also assume that government revenue 
through money creation is balanced by the exogenous change in the lump-sum 
transfer, Then, assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions under 
perfect foresight are 
(3) 
(4)  (1bJ  u‘(c,) = P (W,+I) u’(c,+J + v’(q+I~P,+l)  I. 
u’(c,) = P(1 + r)  u’(c,+1)7 
Since P(l + r) = 1, the monotonicity of  u’(c,> implies that c,  is constant 
over time. Furthermore, since p* = 1, the purchasing power parity condition 
leads to p, = e,. Hence, denoting the constant consumption level by  c,  the 
dynamic equation (4) is written as 
(5)  lie, = P Wer+,) [ 1 + (l/ur(c))  vr(Mf+l/eI+l  ) 1. 
Equation (5) determines the dynamic system in our model. By  using this 
equation, the following sections investigate whether nominal exchange rate 
and real money balances may show endogenous cycles under the flexible ex- 
change rate regime. In considering periodic endogenous cycles, we define the 
iterates of  a function h of  a set X  into itself by  hl(x) = h(x) and h(x) = 
h(h”(x)) for all integers i 2 2. We  then define a periodic orbit (or a cycle) 
of  period k of  the backward perfect foresight map h by  the sequence (x,+~, 
x,+~-~,  . . . ,  x,) such that (i) x,,,  is a fixed point of hk,  i.e., xfik  = hk(  xr+J, and 
(ii)xf+k-l  =h(x,,,)#x,+,foralli=  1 ,...,  k- 1. 
8.3  Endogenous Exchange Rate Cycles 
Under the flexible exchange rate regime, the nominal money supply M, is 
exogenously determined by the monetary authority. In this paper, we consider 
the case in which the monetary authority keeps the growth rate of money sup- 
ply constant as follows: 
(6)  M,  =  zM,-, for all t. 
Then, (5) and (6) lead to 
(7)  m, =  (PM  m,,,  [ 1 + (11 u’(c))  v’(m,+J  1 , 
where m, =  Mj  e,. 
The dynamic equation (7) determines the dynamic system of  real money 
balances, m,, in our model under the flexible exchange rate regime. If we define 
2. It is well known that lim,+=  c, = 0 when p(1 + r) < 1 and lirn,+-  c, = +-  when p(1 + 
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(8)  f(m> =  Wz)  m  + (11 ~’(c))  v’(m>l, 
equation (7) implies that rn, can be written as a function of m,,, such that m, = 
fl  m,+,  ) under perfect foresight. That is, our system induces well-defined back- 
ward perfect foresight (b.p.f.) dynamics in which the expected future value 
determines its current value. This b.p.f. map is continuously differentiable. 
In order to focus our attention on the well-defined dynamics, the following 
analysis assumes that z > p, lirnm+,f’(m) > 1, and lim,,++-f’(m) < 1. Then, 
there exists a steady-state equilibrium of real money balances, m*, such that 
[(z -  p)/p]  u’(c) = v’(m*)  under the above assumptions. This steady-state 
equilibrium m*  is  a unique steady-state equilibrium if  and  only if  limm,, 
mv’(m)  > 0. When limm,,  mv’(m) = 0, there is another steady-state equilib- 
rium such that m, = 0. However, when m, = 0, the level of nominal exchange 
rate e,  is infinite (i.e., the domestic currency has no value) because M,  is finite. 
In the following analysis, we  investigate the possibility that the backward 
perfect foresight dynamics (7) may have period k 2 2 cycles and local sunspot 
equilibria even under some economically reasonable conditions. Under the as- 
sumption presented above, it  is well known that  a sufficient condition for 
period-two cycles and local sunspot equilibria in a one-dimensional map (7) is 
that If’(m)  I > 1 at m =  m*  (see, e.g., Grandmont 1985; Blanchard and Kahn 
1980). By using this condition, Fukuda (1992) showed the following proposi- 
tion. 
Proposition: A sufficient condition for the existence of period-two cycles and 
local sunspot equilibria of real money balances is that 
(9)  -  m*  v”(m*)  / v’(m*)  >  2 [d(z -  p)], 
where m* is the steady-state equilibrium such that v’(m*)  =  [(z -  p) / p] ~’(c). 
The proposition states that when the relative risk aversion of the utility on 
real money balances is large at the steady state m*, equilibrium real money 
balances may  have period-two cycles and local sunspot equilibria. Further- 
more, since the nominal money supply is exogenously given, the proposition 
implies that the equilibrium nominal exchange rate may also have period-two 
cycles and local sunspot equilibria. 
In general, our model of money in the utility function may have higher-order 
periodic and  aperiodic cycles. However, without  specifying the functional 
form of  u and v it is difficult to find the existence of  higher-order periodic 
and aperiodic cycles in our model. Hence, in the next section, we investigate 
numerically the existence of  such higher-order periodic and aperiodic cycles 
for three specific classes of utility functions. 
8.4  Examples 
In this section, we investigate the existence of periodic and aperiodic cycles 
under the flexible exchange rate regime for specific utility functions. We con- 
sider the following three classes of utility functions: 208  Shin-ichi Fukuda 
(10) 
(11) 
v(m,)  = m,l-R  / (1 -  R) ,  where R > 0; 
v(m,> = -(b12) (m, -  k)2 ,  where b > 0, when m, <  k, 
when m, 2  k;  = 0, 
(12) 
The utility functions are, respectively, a member of the constant relative risk- 
aversion family, of  the quadratic family, and of  the constant absolute risk- 
aversion family. For each utility function, the dynamic equation (7) is writ- 
ten as 
(13)  m, =  (BIZ) m,,,  [1 + (Uu’(c)) m3; 
(14)  m, = y m,,, (1 -  6 m,,,), when m,,, < k, 
when m,,,  2  k; 
(15)  m, =  (P/z> m,,,  [1 + (1/urW)  exp(-a  m,,,)l, 
where y = (p/z)[l  + (b/u’(c))k]  and 6 = (b/u’(c))/[l + (b/u’(c))  k].  Hence, 
the proposition leads to the following corollary. 
Corollary:  A  sufficient  condition  for  the  existence  of  period-two  cycles 
and local sunspot equilibria under the flexible exchange rate regime is that 
(i) R > 2 [d(z -  p)] in utility function (lo), (ii) (p/z)[l + (b/u’(c)k]  >  3 under 
utility function (ll), and (iii) log[(l/u’(c))(p/(z -  p))] > 2[6(z -  p)]  under 
utility function (12). 
The corollary implies that there exist period-two cycles and local sunspot 
equilibria under the flexible exchange rate regime (i) when z  or R  is large 
enough in utility function (lo), (ii) when parameter b, l/u’(c), or k is large 
enough in utility function (ll), and (iii) when u’(c) is small enough in utility 
function (12). In fact, for parameter values satisfying the sufficiency conditions 
in the corollary, nominal exchange rate and real money balances may  show 
very complicated dynamic paths around the steady-state equilibrium. 
In figures 8.2-8.4,  we describe these possibilities for given expected nomi- 
nal exchange rates (or equivalently real money balances) at time I: In the fig- 
ures, we depict the dynamics of nominal exchange rate and real money bal- 
ances for the above three classes of  utility functions. The dynamics clearly 
show that both nominal exchange rate and real money balances follow very 
complicated fluctuations around the steady-state equilibrium? In particular, al- 
though the expected nominal exchange rate at time T is very close to that of 
the steady state, the transition paths are very different and highly volatile. 
8.5  Extensions 
v(m,) = -  (l/u) exp(-u  mJ,  where u > 0. 
= (P/z> m,,,, 
The results in the preceding sections were derived from a very simple small 
open economy model. Thus, in order to derive more realistic implications, the 
3. Since the growth rate of money supply is positive (i.e,,  z  > 1). nominal exchange rates have 
trends to the  depreciation in the figures. 209  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 




(ii) Dynamics of real money balances 
T 
TIME 
Fig. 8.2  The dynamics of exchange rate and real money balances under utility 
function (10) 
Notes:  Parameter set : p = 0.9, z = 1.2, u'(c) = 1,  R = 15, T = 30. Terminal values :  rn, = 1 
or 0.9. 
model may need to be extended in several directions. We here extend the model 
by introducing the endogenous labor supply. We consider an economy in which 
each individual maximizes the following utility function: 
m 
u = c  p' [U(C,> + ww,, ly/PJI, 
r=o 
(16) 
where L, is the amount of leisure at period t. We assume that the utility function 
w(L,m)  satisfies the usual concave assumption. We also allow the possibility 
that the utilities of leisure and real money balances are not separable. 
The budget constraint of the representative agent is 
(17) 
where Lo is the feasible labor hour and W, is real wage at period t. 
b, =  (1 + r)  b,-, + W,  (Lo -  L,) -  C, -  M,+,/p,  + Mjp, -  T,, 
Assuming  a  linear production  function  such  that  y, = L,, it  holds  that 210  Shin-ichi Fukuda 






(ii) Dynamics of real money balances 
0.5 1 
IIlT = 0.9 
TIME 
Fig. 8.3  The dynamics of exchange rate and real money balances under utility 
function (11) 
Notes: Parameter set : p = 0.9,  z = 1.1,  u'(c)  =I, k = 1, b = 2, T = 30. Terminal  values : mT  = 
0.8  or 0.9. 
W, = 1 in equilibrium. Thus, since p(l + r) = 1 and p, = e,, the first-order 
conditions for an interior solution are 
(18)  u'(c,) =  Uf(C,+J' 
(19) 
(20)  Wt)  ~'(c,)  = P (l/e,+J  [u'(c,+J + w2(Lr+l, m,+l)l. 
Condition (19) states that L, can be written as a function of m,.  Thus, defining 
a function cp  such that L, = cp(m,) and substituting this function into (20),  we 
obtain 
wi(Lp mJ =  w\(Lr+i,  mr+i), 
(21)  (lie,) ~'(c,)  = P (l/er+I)  ur(cr+,)  + *(mr+J  19 211  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
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0 
TIME 
Fig. 8.4  The dynamics of exchange rate and real money balances under utility 
function (12) 
Notes: Parameter set : p =0.9,  z = 1.2, u'(c)  = 0.0001, a = 1, T = 30. Terminal values :  rn, = 
10 or 9. 
where Wmf+J  = w,(cp(m,), q+J 
Since condition (18) implies that c, is constant over time, the dynamic equa- 
tion (21) is mathematically equivalent to the dynamic equation (7) if  we re- 
place T(m,+J  by  v(mf+l).  Hence, all results in earlier sections carry through. 
Thus, we  can easily see that the nominal exchange rate and real money bal- 
ances may have endogenous cycles in the model of endogenous labor supply. 
In addition, since L, is a function of m,, we can also see that labor supply may 
also fluctuate endogenously unless the utility function w(L,  m)  is separable in 
leisure and real money balances. Since the level of  consumption is constant 212  Shin-ichi Fukuda 
over time, this implies the possibility that the current account may also fluctu- 
ate endogenously. This result is noteworthy because such endogenous cycles 
of the current account cannot be derived in the model of previous sections. 
8.6  The Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
The question of optimal exchange rate regime is one of the most extensively 
debated topics in international macroeconomics. Traditionally, the debate was 
based mainly on Mundell-Fleming-type open macro models (see, e.g., Boyer 
1978; Turnovsky 1984; Fukuda and Hamada 1988; Fukuda 1991). However, 
the analysis was limited because the models were not necessarily based on 
individuals’ maximizing behavior. In order to overcome this limitation, several 
authors have recently attempted to investigate the optimal exchange rate re- 
gime in models of money with individuals’ maximizing behavior. For example, 
Helpman (1981), Lucas (1982), and Aschauer and Greenwood (1983) have 
considered models  of  money  with  cash-in-advance constraint.  They  have 
shown that, without distortions, the choice of exchange rate regime has no real 
effect on resource allocation but that the existence of distortions introduces the 
possibility of real effects of exchange rate management. However, their anal- 
yses have focused mainly on resource allocation in the steady-state equilib- 
rium and paid little attention to the transition path to the steady-state equilib- 
rium. Hence, it is relatively unknown how  the exchange rate regime affects 
the  transition path  to  the  steady-state equilibrium. This  has been  investi- 
gated by  Fukuda (1992), however. He  showed how the endogenous cycles 
under the  flexible exchange rate regime will be  ruled  out under the  fixed 
exchange rate regime. This section briefly reviews his main result by consider- 
ing the dynamic property under the fixed exchange rate regime in our basic 
model. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime, nominal money supply M,  is endoge- 
nously determined by  the monetary authority to keep the nominal exchange 
rate e, constant. Hence, by noting that e, = e,,,, equation (5) can be written as 
Since the left-hand side of  equation (22) is constant over time, equation (22) 
implies that real money balances m, are constant over time. In particular, since 
the real money balances that satisfy (22) are equivalent to those of the steady 
state with constant money supply (i.e., z = l),  real money balances stay at their 
steady-state equilibrium forever under the fixed exchange rate regime without 
changing the amount of money supply. This result is in marked contrast with 
that under the flexible exchange rate regime, because real balances under the 
flexible exchange rate regime may show endogenous fluctuations for some pa- 
rameter set and terminal condition. That is, once the monetary authority can 
commit to fixing the exchange rate, real balances (and obviously nominal ex- 
change rate) show no endogenous fluctuations for any parameter set. 213  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
One noteworthy point in the above result is that under the fixed exchange 
rate regime the monetary authority needs to make no intervention in the foreign 
exchange market to reduce the nominal exchange rate fluctuation. That is, once 
the initial values of exchange rate and money supply are given, the only neces- 
sary condition for the monetary authority to keep the fixed exchange rate re- 
gime is to make people believe that the monetary authority will endogenously 
determine nominal money supply M, to fix the nominal exchange rate e,. A 
crucial point is that, in our model of  money in the utility function, periodic 
cycles or sunspot equilibria may arise when people’s expectations diverge from 
those of the steady-state equilibrium. Thus, once the commitment of the mone- 
tary authority to fixing the nominal exchange rate makes people’s expectations 
converge to those of the steady-state equilibrium, deviations of expectations 
from the steady-state equilibrium are ruled out under the fixed exchange rate 
regime. 
8.7  Diagrammatic Explanation 
In  order to interpret the results in previous sections, it may  be useful to 
illustrate them by  drawing the locus of (7) in the plane (m,, m,+,).  Figure 8.5 
shows the locus of (7) under the utility function (1  1). When the parameter b is 
small (i.e., the curvature of the utility function is small), the curve is flat and 
the dynamic path of m, shows no cyclical fluctuation. However, when the pa- 
rameter b is large (i.e., the curvature of the utility function is large), the curve 
is backward bending at some critical point p.  That backward-bending curve 
arises reflects the conflict between intertemporal substitution and income ef- 
fects. That is, an expected depreciation of the future exchange rate always has 
a negative substitution effect on current money demand the domestic currency 
(or a positive substitution effect on current demand for consumption). How- 
ever, since the depreciation requires more money holdings for future transac- 
tions, it always has a positive income effect on current money demand (or a 
negative income effect on current demand for consumption). Hence, the total 
effect of  the change in the future exchange rate on current money demand 
is always ambiguous. This ambiguity through intertemporal substitution and 
income effects causes the business cycles that were obtained in the above prop- 
osition and its corollary. 
The only case in which no endogenous fluctuation arises is when real money 
balances m,  stay at the steady-state equilibrium forever. This special case does 
not necessarily happen under the flexible exchange rate regime because each 
individual does  not  necessarily expect real  money balances to  stay  at the 
steady-state equilibrium forever. However, under the fixed exchange rate re- 
gime, the situation is different: the only self-fulfilling rational expectation is 
the expectation that the nominal exchange rate (and real money balances) will 
stay at the steady-state equilibrium forever. As a result, no endogenous fluctu- 
ation arises under the fixed exchange rate regime. 214  Shin-ichi Fukuda 
mt  0 I- 
mt+1 
(ii)  the case that "b" is large 
Fig. 8.5  The phase diagram under utility function (11) 
8.8  A Welfare Implication 
The results in preceding sections have an important welfare implication in 
determining the optimal exchange rate regime. As we explained in section 8.6, 
it is well known that if we simply compare the welfare properties of the steady- 
state equilibria in an economy with some distortions, the optimal exchange 
rate regime is the flexible exchange rate regime with appropriate money supply 
growth. In particular, we can show that, in our model of money in the utility 
function, the optimal rate of money growth is given by Friedman's (1969) rule: 
the rule which maintains a rate of money growth close to the rate of time pref- 
erence (see Woodford [1990b] for its proof). However, as we have shown in 
previous  sections, the equilibrium  corresponding to a given rate of  money 
growth (say, that specified by  Friedman's rule) need not be unique. Since the 215  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
multiple equilibria are Pareto ranked, it also becomes very important to know 
under what exchange rate regime nonconvergent paths can be eliminated. 
In the previous sections, we have shown that nonconvergent paths can be 
eliminated under the fixed exchange rate regime. Thus, although the optimal 
rate of  money  growth under the fixed exchange rate  regime deviates from 
Friedman’s  rule, the fixed exchange rate regime can lead to the second-best 
resource allocation in the sense that nonconvergent paths are eliminated. Of 
course, we may  have  the first-best resource allocation under the flexible ex- 
change rate regime with Friedman’s rule as long as nonconvergent paths do not 
arise. However, as we have shown in the previous sections, endogenous peri- 
odic dynamic paths can arise even under Friedman’s rule. Hence, unless this 
possibility is ruled out, we may have the less desirable resource allocations of 
nonconvergent paths under Friedman’s rule. 
8.9  Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated the dynamic properties in a small open economy 
model of  money in the utility function. Following Fukuda (1990), we have 
shown that under a flexible exchange rate regime the nominal exchange rate 
and real money balances may  have  endogenous periodic dynamic paths for 
some parameter set and future expectations. We  have  also shown that if  the 
labor supply is endogenous, the current account may  also have endogenous 
dynamic paths. 
Our theoretical results may present one answer to why the empirical rele- 
vance of existing classes of exchange rate theories is so poor (see, e.g., Meese 
and Rogoff  [  19831 which shows the poor out-of-sample forecasting perfor- 
man~e).~  If a variable follows a chaotic path, its path would be extremely sensi- 
tive to the initial value and its forecast would be very difficult by usual statisti- 
cal procedures. At the current stage, there is very little empirical evidence 
suggesting the presence of chaos in the exchange rate market. (An exceptional 
work is by Brock, Hsieh, and LeBaron [1991], which has applied the Brock- 
Dechert-Scheinkman statistic to the yeddollar exchange rate with four other 
major  exchange rates.) However, further  successful empirical  studies may 
prove the potential importance of a chaotic model of exchange rate. 
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Comment  Michihiro Ohyama 
This paper constructs a simple but very interesting model of a small open econ- 
omy with representative agents optimizing under flexible and fixed exchange 
rates. It  shows that under flexible exchange rates, the nominal exchange rate 
and real money balances may  fluctuate periodically, whereas under fixed ex- 
change rates the endogenous cycles of real money balances can be ruled out. 
In view of this result, the fixed exchange rate regime is said to be desirable in 
comparison with the flexible exchange rate regime, in the sense that the former 
eliminates nonconvergent adjustment paths that the latter may have to accom- 
modate. 
The analysis of the model seems to be impeccable, and the results are neatly 
presented and summarized. Thus, all that I can do as a discussant is to recon- 
sider the assumptions of the model and present some comments on their impli- 
cations. 
Balanced Current Account 
maximizing a utility function, 
The paper considers a small open economy with the representative agent 
described in equation,,  (1) in section 8.2. It is said that real money balances, 
M,/p,, held at the beginning of  the period yield some utility since money re- 
duces the transaction cost of consumption. If the agent holds money solely for 
the purpose of reducing transaction cost, however, his or her utility function 
may not be separable into consumption and real money balance as is presently 
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assumed. The present assumption seems to imply that the agent derives utility 
from holding money quite independently of his or her consumption of goods. 
As is shown in the paper, this assumption of  a separable utility function, 
coupled with another strong assumption that the agent’s rate of time preference 
is equal to the world interest rate, leads to the conclusion that optimal con- 
sumption is constant through time. Since output is constant, the budget con- 
straint (2)  implies that the economy’s current account is always balanced, with 
its trade account exhibiting a surplus or deficit corresponding to the interest 
payment arising from the initial (historically given) external debt. This seems 
to be an overly simplistic setup for a discussion of  desirable exchange rate 
regime. 
Needless to say, there are at least two distinct ways out of this trap. One is 
to modify the separability of  the utility function, and the other is to modify 
the constancy of the rate of time preference. I hope that Fukuda gives some 
consideration to these modifications. 
Transactions Money in Utility Function 
The author seems to believe that money must enter the representative agent’s 
utility function along with consumption, separately or otherwise, as long as 
money is needed to reduce transactions cost. It seems to me, however, that 
the most direct and purest way  of introducing money holding for transactions 
purposes in the present setup is simply to assume that the real money balance 
to be held at the beginning of each period is a function of  the consumption 
planned for that period. Under this cash-in-advance approach, the other as- 
sumptions of the present model imply constancy of  consumption and, there- 
fore, of real money balance. Thus, fixed and flexible exchange rates become 
virtually indistinguishable. 
Despite the interpretation of money in the utility function given in the pres- 
ent paper, I believe that it is necessary to go beyond the simple transactions 
motive of  holding money if  one is to investigate the relative desirability of 
flexible and fixed exchange rates. It may be one’s love for money, distinct from 
one’s need for consumption-the  motive posited in the paper-or  some specu- 
lative reason that motivates one’s holding money. Paul Krugman, a recent con- 
vert to the school of fixed exchange rate regime, argues convincingly in a re- 
cent paper that  the  fatal deficiency  of  the  flexible exchange regime is its 
vulnerability to an attack of destabilizing speculation. 
Some Questions 
Finally, let me pose some questions regarding possible extensions of  the 
model. First, the present paper assumes a small open economy facing the rate 
of interest and terms of  trade given in the world. The international monetary 
system must be designed, however, to meet the needs of countries of compara- 
ble size, each with its own monetary authority. It is, therefore, desirable to 219  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
extend the present analysis to a model comprising at least two countries. The 
models of Matsuyama (1  991) and Fukuda (1990) cited in this paper may pro- 
vide useful departures. 
Second, the fixed exchange rate regime discussed here must be distinguished 
from the adjustable-peg regime. The latter is vulnerable to speculative attack 
since the monetary authority’s commitment to fixing the exchange rate at a 
given level is inadequate. The real choice is often between the flexible ex- 
change rate regime and  the  adjustable-peg regime rather than between the 
flexible exchange rate regime and the fixed exchange rate regime. Is it possible 
to construct a model of the adjustable-peg regime along the lines of the model 
in the present paper? 
Third, toward the end of the paper, the author discusses the welfare implica- 
tions of  the present analysis. The discussion is, however, very brief and it is 
difficult for me to understand the welfare propositions asserted there. For in- 
stance, it is asserted that the fixed exchange rate regime can lead to the second- 
best resource allocation in the sense that nonconvergent paths are eliminated. 
It seems to me that the author has to expound on this and other welfare proposi- 
tions in greater detail. 
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COmtneIlt  Shang-Jin Wei 
The central aspect of Shin-ichi Fukuda’s paper is an interesting demonstration 
that chaotic movement and sunspot equilibria of exchange rate can arise in a 
theoretic model. Building on this theoretical possibility of chaos, Fukuda then 
argues (mostly informally) that a flexible exchange rate system tends to yield 
lower welfare than a fixed rate regime. 
Deriving chaos in an exchange rate model, by itself, is an interesting result. 
I will focus my comment on this aspect of the paper. Meese and Rogoff (1983) 
first challenged the empirical relevance of  existing classes of  exchange rate 
theories by showing their inferior out-of-sample forecasting performance rela- 
tive to a simple atheoretical random-walk specification. Many people since 
then have tried alternative specifications or alternative estimation methods of 
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exchange rate models in an  attempt to outperform the random-walk model. 
Almost all efforts have failed. It is important to note that the failure of  eco- 
nomic models to outperform a random-walk specification does not establish 
that the (log) exchange rate follows a random walk. In fact, a direct test of the 
iid.  hypothesis for the change in the log exchange rate actually rejects such a 
null hypothesis (e.g., Brock, Hsieh, and LeBaron 1991). 
A chaos model of  exchange rate such as the Fukuda model could, in prin- 
ciple, explain these empirical findings. We  know that if  a variable (which is a 
well-defined function of other economic fundamentals) follows a chaotic path, 
its path would be extremely sensitive to the initial value (the so-called butterfly 
effect), Since the margin of  error in measuring usual fundamental variables 
(e.g., GNP) is not low, we need not be surprised that exchange rate path seems 
not very forecastable by looking at these fundamentals, even if  exchange rate 
theories have identified correctly that economic fundamentals that matter for 
exchange rate movement. Second, a deterministic chaos need not be distin- 
guishable from a stochastic (in particular, random-walk) series by  usual statis- 
tical procedures. 
If  a chaos model of  exchange rate has this appealing potential, how do we 
get chaos into a model? Fukuda chooses a representative agent approach with 
money-in-the-utility specification. What initially follows a chaotic path in his 
model is the domestic price level (and consequently real money balances). A 
key step to get chaos in the foreign exchange market is the assumption of pur- 
chasing power parity (PPP), so that chaos in the domestic price level can be 
transmitted into chaos in the exchange rate. However, many studies have shown 
that the PPP does not hold for the short horizons within which erratic exchange 
rate movement is thought to arise. In  addition, a priori, one might think that 
exchange rates, or other asset prices, may be chaotic for certain time periods. 
But it appears to be stretching the point to believe domestic price level and real 
money balance to be erratic or chaotic. 
More important, the role of the speculative market itself is missing in Fuku- 
da’s model. When people talk about erratic movement in the foreign exchange 
or any asset market, they have in mind more often than not some aspects of 
speculative trading itself as the amplifier or the source of  short-term erratic 
fluctuation, which  is not  necessarily related to  economic fundamentals. It 
seems desirable to have  a model of  chaotic exchange rate that builds upon 
speculative trading per se, without relying on the heavy assumption of the PPP. 
In the next part of my comment, I will show in a very simple model that this 
can be done. The source of chaos in my model is the interaction of speculative 
activities among heterogeneous traders. Chaos is not present all the time, but 
it occurs for some parameter values. During the times when chaos does arise, 
the exchange rate movement can be very erratic, including having quantitative 
breaks even when the fundamentals do not fluctuate. The time path of exchange 
rate is extremely sensitive to the initial value (or the degree of its precision), 
which makes it virtually impossible to forecast exchange rates on the basis of 221  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
economic variables measured with errors. Finally, exchange rate can overreact 
to “insignificant” news. 
Alternative Model Based on Interaction among Heterogenous Agents 
This alternative model derives chaotic movement of exchange rate from in- 
teraction among heterogenous traders in the market. The presence of heteroge- 
nous traders in the foreign exchange market has been recognized before to 
have important implications. For example, the presence of fundamental traders 
and chartists has been argued as an explanation for the large dollar cycle in the 
1980s (Frankel and Froot 1990). 
In the following model, there are two classes of traders. The first class is 
informed fundamental traders, who believe in economic fundamentals and 
economic models and have some private but noisy information about the fun- 
damentals. The second class is speculative chartists (similar to the noise trades 
in Black [  19861 or Kyle [1985]). We could have a third class, uninformed fun- 
damental traders, who would complicate the derivations without adding much 
new insight. 
The Environment 
To make the story as simple as possible, I will make some drastic assump- 
tions. There are two types of assets. The first is a riskless domestic bond, whose 
one-period rate of interest is normalized to be zero. The second is a foreign 
bond, which also has a zero rate of interest when evaluated in the foreign cur- 
rency. For simplicity, let domestic and foreign markets for foreign bonds be 
perfectly segregated (for example, a domestic U.S.-dollar bond market and a 
Euro-yen bond market. A Japanese ban on capital outflow prevents Japanese 
investors from investing in either of the two markets). Every informed funda- 
mental trader is endowed with one unit of foreign bond, so the total supply of 
foreign bond in the market is equal to the number of informed traders, 0. 
Informed Fundamental Traders 
A representative fundamental trader has a negative exponential utility func- 
tion with a constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 6. We  assume that 
she has a two-period investment horizon (i.e., she will exit the foreign ex- 
change market at the end of next period). She observes a noisy signal, i, about 
v, the ex  post value of next-period exchange rate, v =  S(t + 1): 
(1)  i=v+e, 
where e is a white noise variable. We  assume that v and e are independently 
distributed, v has a normal distribution with mean zero and precision T”,  and e 
is also a normal variate with mean zero and precision 7,.  The informed trader’s 
information set contains all the past and present values if i’s, the past and pres- 
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informed trader cares only about the value of her wealth at next period, the 
present value of i is the only relevant information for her. Let X(t) be her de- 
mand for foreign bonds. Since she is endowed with one unit of foreign bond, 
her demand for domestic bonds is [I -  X(t)]S(t).  where S(t) is the spot ex- 
change rate at time t. More precisely, the informed fundamental trader solves 




max E{ -e-SW  I i(t)) , 
W =  X(t)v + [I -  X(t)]S(t). 
The solution to this problem is 
(4) 
where 
X(t) = pi(t) -  aS(t) , 
(3) 
Chartists 
Let Z(t)  be the chartists' collective demand for foreign bonds at time t. This 
demand is assumed to be proportional to the chartists' subjective expectation 
of the rate of return on the foreign bonds, denoted by RsetI+,.  Let u(t) be the 
expectational error made by the chartists. Then, 
and their demand for foreign bonds is 
(7)  11. 
The chartists here can also represent program traders, or any traders that use 
exogenous trading rules. 
Equilibrium 
An equilibrium in the model is defined to be a list {X(t),  Z(t),  S(t)}, such 
that X(t) maximizes the informed fundamental traders'  expected utility, Z(t) 
satisfies the  chartists'  trading  rule,  and  S(t) clears the market  (for foreign 
bonds). 
Applying the definition of  an equilibrium, we know that S(t)  has to satisfy 
the following condition 
(8)  0  X(t) + Z(t) = 0  . 223  Endogenous Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
With appropriate substitutions, the equilibrium exchange rate path can be 
characterized by 
(9) 
This seemingly simple first-order difference equation is, in fact, capable of 
generating chaotic movement for certain parameter values. To see this, let us 
first make a simple transformation.  Define 
on S(t) 
ru(t)  - r + opi(t) -0  .  Y(t) = 
Then, equation (9) can be rewritten as 
Y(t + 1) =  CY(i,t)  Y(t)  [l -  Y(t)l , 
where 
(12)  a(i,t) = 
[ru(t) - r + @pi(t) -  @I2 
rz[&  + 1) - 11  + T@pi(t + 1) -  I73 ’ 
Dynamics of  nonlinear equations have  been extensively studied recently. 
The above equation is one of the simplest nonlinear equations that can generate 
chaos. Let me summarize a relevant result. 
Lemma (May 1976): Consider 1 < a(i,t)  < 4. The behavior of equation (11) 
depends sensitively on the value of a(i): 
(1) For 1 <  cx < 3, the path of Y(t)  converges to some fixed point. 
(2) Starting from CY = 3, the fixed point becomes unstable. 
(3) Starting from CY =  3.5700, the “chaotic” region begins. That is, the accu- 
mulation of cycles of period 2” starts for some integer n. 
(4) Starting from CY = 3.6786, the first odd-period cycle appears. 
(5) Starting from a  = 3.8284, cycles with period 3 appear. By Sarkovsky’s 
theorem, this means that cycles with every integer period are present at 
the same time. 
(6) For CY =  4.0000, the “chaotic” region ends. 
(7) There are stable cycles in the “chaotic” region. 
This lemma shows that the time path Y(t)  is extremely sensitive to the parame- 
ter values. Although chaos is not present at all times, the point is that it can 
occur for some parameter values. 
Note that a(i, t)  is a function of the information variable, i. This suggests 
two possibilities. First, for certain fixed values of  i, say i(t  + 1) =  i(t) = some 
constant (so that there is no fluctuation in the information about fundamentals), 
the exchange rate could still be very volatile. As is well known from the chaos 
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large breaks, even with absolutely no shocks to the fundamentals to the market. 
Second, a slight change in the value of  i(t  + I), can dramatically change the 
dynamics of the exchange rate path. For example, consider a small change in 
the value of  i(t  + 1) that changes a  from 3.56 to 3.58. For the original value 
of  i(t  + l),  the exchange rate is nonchaotic. With this slight change in the 
news (or rumors) about the fundamentals, the exchange rate suddenly becomes 
erratic. Therefore, the exchange rate could appear to overreact to “insignifi- 
cant” news. 
What Do We Know Empirically? 
Is there empirical evidence suggesting the presence of chaos in the exchange 
rate market? Since this is a conference on East Asian economies, let me first 
note that there are no chaotic movements in the bilateral exchange rates of any 
of  the nine East Asian developing countries in terms of the U.S. dollar, since 
most of them either explicitly peg to or implicitly assign heavy weight in their 
currency basket to the dollar. The same can be said of many developing coun- 
tries outside the Pacific region. 
What about the yeddollar rate (or other exchange rates)? Empirical tests on 
this are very few. One exception is Brock, Hsieh, and LeBaron (1991), who 
have applied the Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman (BDS) statistic to the yeddollar 
rate together with four other major exchange rates. The result from the BDS 
test is consistent with both a low-dimensional chaos or stochastic nonlinear 
process. On the other hand, there is a lack of collaborative evidence in support 
of the chaos hypothesis. If attention is restricted to stochastic nonlinear mod- 
els, they conclude that nonlinearity in variance is more plausible than nonline- 
arity in means.’ 
To summarize, a chaotic model of exchange rates has an appealing feature 
in its potential to explain the empirical failure of many earlier theoretical mod- 
els of exchange rate determination. Such a chaotic model can be derived in a 
representative-agent macro model as in Fukuda or in a heterogenous-traders 
micro model as in this comment. Systematic empirical work is still needed 
in order to evaluate fully the empirical relevance of  the chaos hypothesis of 
exchange rates. 
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